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Introduction 
As mass communications close the distances over which 
people routinely interact, there is a question about the increase in 
social homogenization at the expense of regional identity. In a 
society covering as much geographic area and encompassing as 
many cultures as the United States, the question is certainly valid. 
Traditionally, this diversity has been recognized as a "melting pot," 
an analogy attempting to institutionalize a sort of homogenous 
diversity; the "melting pot" analogy is now giving way to notions 
of multiculturalism. However, one may wonder if this social diver-
sity can avoid being buried beneath the homogenizing mass media 
culture. Whether homogenization is good or bad, the subject is 
worth investigating, if only to learn if such a trend exists in an 
empirically observable form that can be placed in an objective con-
text accessible to those concerned with regional trends and their 
implications. 
Consequently, the purpose of this limited study is to deter-
mine the trends, if any, in regional variation in religion and politics 
from 1975 to 1996. I will attempt to identify these trends and spec-
ulate on their relationship to the larger question of homogenization. 
Though the space in time is relatively short, even in the context of 
America's (relatively) short national history, rapid social and cul-
tural changes in this period have significantly influenced the rela-
tionships among these institutions and their participants. Be it the 
Watergate scandal just three years before my study begins or the 
Roe v. Wade decision shortly thereafter, national events have poten-
tially influenced regional relationships among churches, states, and 
citizens. The question is-if so, how? 
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Literature Review 
Much of the pioneering modem work on regional questions 
was done in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, decades in which sociol-
ogists like Carle C. Zimmerman, Norval Glenn, and J.L. Simmons 
worked toward defining regions and asking questions about the 
implications of regional trends. Zimmerman's attempts to define 
regions were based primarily on his studies of the Great Plains 
region of the United States, but he delineated regions in a manner 
departing from the traditional geographic definitions, instead sug-
gesting that additional determinants might be necessary. While 
later sociologists have suggested that his work might have been 
more thorough, it remains an essential starting point for under-
standing regional differences in the U.S. (Kraenzel 1976, 210-212). 
Glenn and Simmons asked the question that concerns this paper 
and concluded that, at least in 1967, regional differences were still 
distinct. Further, they predicted that these differences might grow 
sharper with time (Glenn and Simmons 1967, 192-193) because of 
continuing differences in regional urbanization patterns and the 
inability of mass media to override pre-existing regional values. 
Their conclusion, though, must be assessed within the context of its 
time. Glenn and Simmons were writing just as the Civil Rights 
struggle and the Vietnam conflict were sharply dividing America, 
and obvious regional differences were to be expected. Further, they 
themselves admitted that their cohorts represented the pre-World 
War II generation, which grew up without access to homogenizing 
factors like television. 1 Not that this limitation invalidates their 
conclusion; in fact, it is just these sorts of factors that may serve, 
for better or worse, to sustain diversity. 
Later studies departed from larger complexities in favor of 
smaller ones, like the South and religion, both individually and 
together. Samuel E. Wallace wrote at length on the history of the 
regional delineation of the South and stated in no uncertain terms 
that, with its senses of "time and place," it continues to stand as a 
distinct region (Wallace 1981 , 440). Bailey, Sikkink, and Smith 
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concluded that the strength of religious identity within the South 
was strong enough to "convert" even in-migrating non-
Southemers, but that it lacked the strength to sustain itself outside 
the region, even among Southerners migrating to other regions 
(Bailey et al. 1998, 504 ). 
Last, Herting, Grusky, and van Rompaey increased the 
complexity of the regional question by exploring the relationship 
between increased "interstate mobility," regions, and the region-
alisms that those moving among the regions carry with them. 
These researchers used their conclusions as a basis for new socio-
cultural stucturations accounting for relative mobility and deter-
mined that regionalism was still distinct, in part because the struc-
turations were so distinct that homogenization was all but impossi-
ble (Herting et al. 1998, 284). This thoroughly modem approach to 
the problem takes full advantage of innovations in quantitative 
social science research since Zimmerman's pioneering work in 
1949. 
Data and Plan for Analysis 
Regionalism for the purposes of this study is defined as the 
distinctiveness exhibited by those living in a geographic region tra-
ditionally associated with a homogenous cultural character. I will 
approach this distinctiveness by using data from the General Social 
Surveys from 1975 to 1996 in five-year increments. Since not all 
of the questions I have selected were administered in 1972 (the first 
year of the GSS), I begin in 1975, while substituting 1996 for 1995 
for two reasons: the survey was not conducted in 1995, and 1996 
is the date of the latest available data (the public release of the 1998 
survey is still pending). The GSS, which is an extensively studied 
survey with a high frequency of administration, carries over the 
variables examined here with little or no change in question word-
ing from survey to survey.2 
The GSS data is divided into nine geographic regions. 
These regions include the Northeast (NE), Middle Atlantic (MA), 
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East North Central (ENC), West North Central (WNC), South 
Atlantic (SA), East South Central (ESC), West South Central 
(WSC), Mountain (M), and Pacific (P) regions.3 
I have selected four specific survey questions for consider-
ation, all of which have been asked in every study since 1975. 
These concern religious preference, the frequency of attendance at 
religious services, political view, and party affiliation. I chose the 
questions concerning religion and politics because prior studies 
have shown that obvious regional variations were to be expected in 
these areas. The specific questions have been intended to measure 
both formal affiliations (political party and religious preference) 
and practical associations (political view and religious attendance). 
The numbers of cases ranged from about 1,400 in 1975 to 2,800 in 
1996. 
Using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, I col-
lapsed the response categories to help in the practical analysis and 
cross-tabulation. The regions were left intact, but the survey ques-
tions were re-coded to facilitate analysis. The religious preference 
categories were left unaltered except for coding those unable or 
unwilling to respond ("don't know" or "missing") as "missing." 
The attendance question was re-coded from nine categories (rang-
ing from yearly to weekly attendance) to four: "never," "rarely" 
(less than once a year, once or twice a year, or several times a year), 
"moderate" (1 to 2-3 times per month), and "frequently" (weekly or 
nearly so, or several times per week). The political view question 
was re-coded from seven categories to three: "liberal" (very, slight-
ly, and moderately liberal), "moderate," and "conservative" (very, 
slightly, and moderately conservative). Finally, I re-coded the party 
affiliation question from nine categories to four: "Democrat" 
(strong and moderate Democrat), "moderate" (liberal moderate, 
moderate, and conservative moderate), "Republican" (strong and 
moderate republican), and "other." 
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Region and Religion 
Table 1 illustrates the relationship between region and reli-
gious affiliation. The Cramer's V statistics for each table indicate 
that the relationship between region and religious preference is sta-
tistically significant in each year. The most recent year shows the 
weakest association (V=.175), but the statistical significance sug-
gests that regional differences have persisted over these two 
decades. 
Looking at changes within and between regions over time is 
also interesting. New England reflects a growing Protestant influ-
ence that has fended off ambivalence and other religions and shows 
declines in Catholic and Jewish populations. This change may be 
attributable to some sort of persistent evangelical drive in the 
region, possibly peaking in 1985 and coinciding with a sharp 
decline in Judaism, which returns to normal by 1990. At least some 
of the increases in the number of Catholics in the Pacific may be 
attributable to the influx of Catholic Vietnamese since the end of 
the Vietnam Conflict in 197 5 and to the chain migration of families 
from the Philippines. The stability of Jewish populations is likely 
attributable to intense homogeneity and a lack of emphasis on pros-
elytization. The increase in non-preference may be a key indicator 
of regional decline since it is generally at the expense of Protestants 
and Catholics, whose respective peaks of dominance have declined. 
Also of possible significance is the rise in other religious prefer-
ences in the Pacific, where an eight percent increase is probably 
evidence of other kinds of immigration. 
The patterns indicate general declines in the number of 
Protestants in all but the New England region, where there was an 
average of ten percent fewer Protestants than Catholics from 1975 
to 1990 but five percent more Protestants than Catholics in 1996. 
The number of Catholics has also generally declined nationwide, 
though it remains stable in New England and is gaining in the 
Pacific. There is a noticeable peak in the numbers of Catholics in 
most regions in 1985 that declines again by 1990. Jewish popula-
tions remain generally stable except in New England, where they 
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have declined overall. In all areas (except New England and the 
Pacific), there are significant increases in the number with no reli-
gious preference; and without exceptions there are also significant 
increases in the number claiming other religions in all regions. 
Table 2 shows the relationship between region and religious 
service attendance. Cramer's V for these tables shows a weaken-
ing relationship over time, though the relationship is still statisti-
cally significant. Looking more closely at regional differences in 
religious attendance, we see with some surprise that it is the East 
and West North Central regions that exhibit the consistently high-
est percentages of attendance, while attendance in the Bible-belted 
South and the Mountain region has declined overall. The Pacific 
maintains a consistently high non-attendance rate. These percent-
ages are most noticeable in the South, where despite a 1990 resur-
gence, an eleven percentage point drop in frequency of attendance 
coincides with a four percentage point increase in non-attendance, 
despite the percentages of rare and moderate attendance exhibiting 
averages similar to the general national results . Controlling for 
preference might ·help clarify this issue and might also suggest 
whether changes in preference in the North Atlantic and Pacific 
regions are affecting those changes in attendance. 
Region and Politics 
The relationships between region and political views (Table 
3) show fluctuating regional differences and trends. Liberalism has 
recovered from declines in the North, Middle Atlantic, and East 
North Central regions but has declined by twelve percentage points 
in the Pacific. Moderates are in general decline in the West North 
Central, South Atlantic, and Mountain regions and are increasing in 
only the East South Central region. Most surprisingly, the number 
of conservatives shows general increases in all but the Middle 
Atlantic and East and West North Central regions, though by 1996 
the number drops again in the East North Central. The West South 
Central region exhibits a curious ambivalence, with no systematic 
change for any of the political views. 
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The general rise in the number of conservatives in tradi-
tionally liberal regions may coincide with the Republican 
Congressional sweep in 1994. Also, despite conservative gains in 
the region, traditionally liberal New England was moving back 
toward liberalism by 1996, along with the Middle Atlantic. The 
most interesting result is the decline in the numbers of liberals and 
the increase in the numbers of conservatives in the Pacific, a result 
that I certainly would not have expected. Perhaps this change 
reflects some local economic or political issue, such as the contro-
versial Proposition 187, which would have radically altered 
California immigration law. A national increase in the number of 
moderates might have been expected, but is absent, suggesting that, 
however they vote, many moderates may still think in terms of tra-
ditional political labels, arid that these labels are related to their 
regions. 
The relationship between region and political view over 
time moves in and out of statistical significance, though the rela-
tionship is consistently weak. Party affiliations show less radical 
shifts (Table 4), though not without notable changes. The number 
of Democrats has declined in the West South Central and Pacific 
regions. This decrease can be contrasted, however, with curious 
back-and-forth percentage shifts in the East North Central and 
Middle Atlantic regions. Curiously, these shifts follow the popu-
larity of the party holding presidential office. That is to say, when 
the popularity of the Republicans holding the presidency is high, 
the number of Democrats at these times in these two regions is 
Weak. For example, the number of Republicans is high in 1980 
(when Reagan displaced a fallen Jimmy Carter) and in 1990 (when 
George Bush enjoyed stellar approval ratings as Operation Desert 
Shield got under way). However, in years when the popularity of 
Republican presidents or presidential candidates is weak, the num-
ber of Democrats is strong. For example, the number of 
Republicans is low in 1975 (when Gerald Ford succeeded a failed 
Richard Nixon), in 1985 (when interest rates were high and 
"Reaganomics" were under fire), and in 1996 (when a Republican 
controlled Congress was under fire and the GOP failed to produce 
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a "winning" candidate in the presidential elections). Moderates 
may account for the rise and fall of these percentages, joining the 
Democrats in years that seem bad for Republicans. Given the gen-
erally negligible Republican gains (except in 1990), the center in 
these two regions seems definitely inclined toward the left. 
Moderates increased in only the North Atlantic region, 
another surprise since the region has traditionally been strongly 
Democratic. Republicans are again increasing in several regions, 
including the South Atlantic, East and West South Central, and 
Pacific regions, probably as economic prosperity prompts migra-
tions, if not as a result of general economic prosperity in general. 
Other parties are frequently missing and generally appear in only 
tiny percentages, but they seem to have increased in the West South 
Central, Mountain, and Pacific regions and to have declined in the 
North Atlantic. 
These trends suggest that most regions are retaining their 
traditional political characters. However, increases in the number 
of Republicans should be viewed with caution since they coincide 
with the elections of 1990, 1992, and 1994 and may change signif-
icantly in 2000. Further, these gains may also not be reckoned as 
losses to the number of Democrats but shifts from the center. 
Whatever the traditional political characters of the regions, 
there is generally a weaker significance in the relationships 
between region and political party affiliation (Table 4). Indeed, this 
regional association is the weakest of the four considered here. The 
fluctuation of correlation suggests that other factors are influencing 
regional politics. 
Conclusions 
The evidence I have presented here does not support either 
the popular perception of cultural homogenization or its sociologi-
cal refutation. Rather, I would suggest that while regionalism 
remains a cultural influence, it is a force in flux. Recent assertions 
about regional holding power (Herting et al.) seem also to apply to 
religion and politics even as occupational and recreational mobili-
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ty increase. Rather than percentages consistently shifting toward 
central trends, we observe minute shifts more easily identifiable as 
fluctuations attributable to those with the strongest ( or weakest) 
convictions. 
Most notable is the shift in the South Atlantic populations, 
which appear to be getting less religious. The remaining question is 
whether this shift is a result of homogenization or a new genera-
tion's disaffection with institutions of the previous generation. If 
the answer is the former, we would expect uniform trends through 
the rest of the U.S., but these are in fact absent. If the answer is the 
latter, then we can expect either a resurgence of those institutions 
as the disaffected generation shifts back toward tradition later in 
life or perhaps a shift of the Bible Belt to the North Atlantic region. 
Political preferences reflect the fluctuation much more 
strongly, but despite increases in conservative and Republican affil-
iation, there is nothing to suggest that regions are losing their dis-
tinctive characteristics. The biggest problem is that the data do not 
cover enough time to allow us to see if the fluctuations in percent-
ages are random fluctuations or signs of larger trends. Further, it 
might be more revealing to add further controls in order to deter-
mine whether and how other factors are influencing the results. 
Nevertheless, my conclusion remains. 
To a rapidly expanding mass media, we have added the 
Internet, possibly the greatest distance equalizer of all, especially 
With electronic commerce steadily overcoming an understandably 
cautious potential consumer market. The future is an uncertainty in 
flux, and while many futures are possible, I would suggest that, 
based on the traditional response of American society, we as a soci-
ety are likely to consolidate internally. That is to say, we will 
~etreat to our traditions, including and especially our regionalism, 
10 an effort to reclaim and revivify our diverse identities, and cre-
ate a society that, despite its diversity, is closer together than ever 
before. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Religious Preferences 
% Region NE MA ENC WNC SA ESC wsc M p 
197S Protestant 31.3 46.6 6S.7 72 . 4 86 . 4 84.S 69 . 4 60 . 7 S6 .4 
N=1488 Catholic 48.4 40.1 26.9 24.8 8.S 6.0 2S.6 24.6 12 . 1 
V= . 19S•• Jewish 6.3 3.4 0 . 9 1.0 2.4 0.8 0.6 
None 14 . 1 7 .6 6 . S 2.9 2.7 7 . 1 4 . 1 14 . 8 18 . 6 
Other 2.3 1.4 2.3 
Total 100 . 0 100 . 0 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100.0 100 . 0 100.0 100. 0 
1980 Protestant 20 . 8 39.S S9.2 73 . S 81.6 91.9 7S.8 69 . 6 S7 . 9 
N=146S Catholic S8.S 44.S 31.0 19 . 6 10 . 9 S.4 i6. 7 20 . 3 20.S 
V=.202*• Jewish S.7 s.o 0.7 2 .0 1.1 0 . 9 2 . S 3.2 
None 9.4 8.8 7.2 4 . 9 S.3 1.8 4.2 7 . 6 13 . 2 
Other S .7 2 . 1 2.0 1.1 0.8 2.S S. 3 
Total 100.0 100. 0 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100.0 100 . 0 100.0 100.0 
198S Protestant 42.6 34 . 8 S6. 7 71.2 77.4 89 . 3 72.0 69.6 S4.2 
N=1S29 Catholic 48 . 9 4S.3 34.4 24 . S ' 15 . 3 S. 7 22 . 7 22 . S 21.1 
V= .212** Jewish 1.1 9 . S 0.7 1 . 1 0 . 8 0.7 2.6 
None 7 .4 8 . 0 7.4 2 .2 S.4 3.3 4 . 7 3.9 17 .9 
Other 2 . S 0. 7 2 . 2 0.8 0.8 3 . 9 4.2 
Total 100. 0 100. 0 100.0 t 00 . 0 100.0 100.0 100 .0 100.0 1 oo.o 
1990 Protestant 39.7 44 . S S8.S 70 . 7 73 . 1 97 . 1 71.3 72.3 S0.8 
N=1367 Catholic 49 . 3 36 .0 30.3 22 . 6 1 s.s 2.9 18 . 3 20 . 5 21.2 
V=.187•• Jewish 2.7 5 . 5 0 .8 0.8 0.9 1.2 4.5 
None 5.S 10 . 5 8. 7 3.8 7 .6 6 . 1 1.2 17 . 9 
Other 2 . 7 3 . 5 1. 7 3.0 2 .9 3.5 4.8 5 . 6 
Total 100 .0 100 . 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1996 Protestant 36.9 40 . 2 S7 .1 65.2 73.4 8S.2 67 .4 41.7 45.2 
N=2899 Catholic 42 . 0 39 . 0 26.8 16. 7 13.4 4 . 8 18 . 9 27 . 1 2 S. 1 
V=.17S• • Jewish 3.8 S.3 1.6 1.0 2.2 1. 9 1. 5 2.4 
None 15 . 3 10 .6 11. 7 11.0 8 . 2 8.6 6 . 8 20 . t 17 . 0 
Other 1.9 4.8 2 . 9 6 . 2 2.8 1.4 4 . 9 9 . S 10.3 
Total 100.0 100. 0 100 . 0 100 .0 100 .0 100 . 0 100 .0 100.0 100.0 
N: number of cases V: Cramer's V probability of error: *: ~.05, ** : ~.01 
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Table 2. Religious Service Attendance 
% Region NE MA ENC WNC SA ESC wsc M 
19 75 never IS .6 18.8 13.0 9.5 8.8 10. 7 9.1 16. 7 
N=l487 rarely 40 . 6 37.2 35.8 24.8 25 . 4 28.6 37 .2 40.0 
V= .152•• moderate 12.S 11.S 10.8 21.9 22 . 0 25.0 14.9 18.3 
frequent 31.3 32.6 40 .4 43 . 8 43. 7 35.7 38 .8 25.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100.0 
1980 never 17 .0 13 .S 9 . 2 6.9 9. I 2.7 10 .0 16.S 
N=l461 rarely 39.6 40.S 38.0 32.4 38.3 28.8 41. 7 40.S 
V= .120•• moderate 5.7 12 . 7 16.1 17 .6 16. 7 14.4 15.0 13.9 
frequent 37 .7 33 . 3 36. 7 43 . 1 36.0 54 . 1 33 .3 29.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1985 never 13.8 14.4 17 .8 9.3 12 .S 8.2 10. 7 12. 7 
N=l530 rarely 47 .9 39.3 30 . 9 28.6 32.3 28. 7 35.6 29.4 
V=.116•• moderate 9.6 9.5 13 . 8 17 .9 18 .3 18.0 18 .1 17 .6 
frequent 28 .7 36.8 37 . S 44.3 36.9 45.1 35.6 40.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1990 never 13. 7 16.9 11.0 13 . 0 13 . 0 4.2 16. l 9.5 
N=l333 rarely 39 . 7 31.8 39.4 36.6 29.4 29.S 30.4 32. l 
V= .095•• moderate 19.2 20.0 14 . 8 16. 8 16.0 26.3 18.8 16. 7 
frequent 27 .4 31.3 34.7 33.6 41.6 40.0 34.8 41. 7 
- Total 100 .0 l 00.0 l 00.0 100.0 l 00.0 100.0 100 .0 100.0 1.996 never 20.3 18.2 13.3 9.7 12.S l 0.8 9 .4 24.0 
N=2823 rarely 43 . l 36.9 36.4 41. l 36. l 32.8 41.2 39 . 6 
v =.094•• moderate 12.4 14.3 17 .s 18 . 4 18 .4 20 .6 20 .0 12.S - frequent 24.2 30. 7 32.8 30.9 32.9 35 .8 29.4 24.0 - Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 .0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N: number of cases V: Cramer's V probability of error: *: <.05, **: <.01 
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Table 3. Political Views 
% Region NE MA ENC WNC SA ESC wsc M p 
1975 Liberal 38. 7 32 . 1 27 . 3 28.0 27 .3 28.9 22 . 8 28 . 6 41 .3 
N=1397 Moderate 37 . I 38.3 44.4 40.0 41.9 30.3 45 . 6 41. I 32 .3 
V=094 Conservative 24.2 29.6 28.3 32 . 0 30 . 7 40.8 31.6 30.4 26 . 3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100.0 100 . 0 I 00 .0 
1980 Liberal 30.6 27.5 24.2 25.5 22 .8 26. 7 25.6 24 . 7 27 .3 
N=1429 Moderate 40.8 42.8 43 . 4 40 . 2 42 . 5 38 . 1 32 . 5 40 . 3 38 .5 
V=.058 Conservative 28 . 6 29. 7 32 . 3 34.3 34 . 7 35.2 41.9 35 . 1 34 .2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 .0 
1985 Liberal 30 . 3 26 . 7 21.5 18 . 2 34.1 19 . I 23 . 4 25 . 0 25 .0 
N=1462 Moderate 42 . 7 44.0 37. 7 44 . 5 30.9 38.2 44 . 1 32 . 0 38 .6 
V=.107** Conservative 27 . 0 29.3 40 . 8 37 .2 35 . 0 42. 7 32 . 4 43 . 0 36 .4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 .0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100.0 I 00 .0 
1990 Liberal 22.9 29 . 5 28.1 20 . 8 30.5 20 .6 25 . 7 22 . 6 31. 3 
N=1315 Moderate 42.9 37 . 3 36.0 38 . 4 31.4 40 . 2 33 . 3 33 . 3 38 . I 
V= .077 Conservative 34 . 3 33.2 36 . 0 40.8 38.1 39 . 2 41.0 44 . 0 30 .7 
Total 100. 0 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 1 oo .o 
1996 Liberal 35.9 28 . 2 22 . 4 25.5 23 . 5 17 .3 21.1 29 . 1 29 .0 
1'1=2743 Moderate 34 . 0 44. 7 43 . 8 36.1 35.6 36 . 8 37. 7 32.3 34 .6 
V= .099** Conservative 30 . 1 27 . 1 33 . 8 38 . 5 40 . 9 45 . 9 41.3 38.6 36 .4 
Total 100.0 100.0· 100.0 100. 0 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 1 oo .o 
N: number of cases V: Cramer's V probability of error: *: <.05, **: <.01 
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Table 4. Party Affiliation 
% Region NE MA ENC WNC SA ESC WSC M p 
1975 Democrat 40.6 36 . 9 28 . 5 35.6 43 . 9 39 . 3 66 . 1 32 . 8 50 . 0 
N=1485 Moderate 39 .1 36 . 2 45 . 5 34 . 6 32.3 44 . 0 21.5 41.0 33 . 9 
V=. 13 2** Republican 18 . 8 26.2 25 . 1 29 . 8 22 . 8 16 . 7 1 1. 6 26.2 14.9 
Other 1.6 0.8 0 . 9 1.0 0.8 1.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 I 00.0 I 00.0 I 00 . 0 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 .0 
1980 Democrat 34 . 0 35 . 1 24 . 8 32. 7 46.4 44 . 5 35.8 29.1 42 . 9 
N= l465 Moderate 45 . 3 38.9 43.0 39.6 33 . 7 31.8 47 . 5 41.8 30 . 9 
V=.089 Republican 20.8 24. 7 22.0 27. 7 19 . 9 22.7 I 5 . 8 27 .8 25. I 
Other 1.3 0 . 3 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.0 
Total 100.0 100 .0 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100.0 100.0 
1985 Democrat 26.6 42 . 7 35 . 7 30.9 48 . 1 50.4 42. 7 24.8 35 . 8 
N=l529 Moderate 54.3 31.2 28 . 6 33.1 25.4 22 .8 37.3 34. 7 28 . 9 
V=. 124** Republican 18. I 24.6 34 .2 36.0 26.1 26.0 27 . 3 39.6 34 . 2 
Other 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.0 0.8 2 . 7 1.0 1.1 
Total 100.0 I 00.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 I 00.0 100 . 0 
1990 Democrat 42.5 37 . 7 27 . 6 28 . 6 39.4 46 . 7 40 . 0 35 . 3 31.3 
N=l368 Moderate 38 . 4 23 . 6 36 . 6 34.6 27 . 5 20 . 0 38 . 3 36 . 5 33 . 5 
V=. 106** Republican 17 . 8 37. 7 35 .0 36.1 32 . 2 33 . 3 20.9 25 . 9 34 . 6 
- Other 1.4 1.0 0.8 0 . 8 0 . 8 0 . 9 2 . 4 0.6 
Total 100 . 0 100 . 0 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100.0 100 . 0 100.0 100.0 
1996 Democrat 26 . 1 38 . 8 32 . 4 32 . 9 33.8 33.0 35 . 5 30. 7 34.0 
N=2898 Moderate 51.6 36 . 1 40 . 5 38 . 6 33 . 8 35 . 9 30.9 38 . 2 35 . 2 
V=.070* Republican 21.7 23 . 4 25 . 3 28.1 31.8 29 . 7 31.3 29.6 28 . 5 
Other 0.6 l. 7 1.8 0 . 5 0 . 6 1.4 2.3 1.5 2 . 4 
Total 100 . 0 100 . 0 100.0 100.0 100 .0 100.0 100 . 0 100.0 100.0 
N: number of cases V: Cramer's V probability of error: *: <.05, **: <.01 
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